Trump's focus on the Middle East could translate to less US involvement in Nato

In April 1949, at the beginning of the Cold War, Nato was formed in Washington. The organisation’s first secretary general was British – Hastings Ismay – formerly Winston Churchill’s chief military adviser in the Second World War.

This US-UK link was seen as a key pillar of the “Atlantic Alliance”. Ismay humorously defined the UK’s Nato mission as “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Things have changed a bit since then. The Russians are still “out” of Western Europe, but the Ukraine invasion means Nato nations see Moscow as a growing threat.

The Americans are still “in” although Donald Trump’s unpredictable presidency often takes ever more unpredictable turns.

The US President, who once boasted about “no new wars”, decided to bomb Iran just a few days before this week’s crucial Nato summit in The Hague. America’s allies were informed rather than consulted. Some predicted that an American attack on Iran could split the alliance, although that seems unlikely right now.

Either way, the European pillar of Nato must make do with less America and perhaps a not-always-reliable US president. That, and the continuing Ukraine war, has forced increased European defence spending. In Germany, military spending is consequently not “down” but pushing hard to go “up” with a new sense of urgency in Berlin and elsewhere.

Mr Trump’s decision to join Israel’s attacks on Iran reinforces this urgent rearmament. Mr Trump’s focus is not primarily on the European continent, and having spoken previously of ending the Ukraine war in 24 hours, his interest in European security seems to have further diminished.

Some military commentators believe Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes one big push before winter will consolidate Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory and he can dictate a hard peace. Others think given the state of Russia's economy, Ukraine will fight on and European rearmament will provide deterrence against a wider conflict.

What is certain is that Nato nations broadly agree to Mr Trump’s demands to spend 5 per cent of gross domestic product on defence, although precisely when that will be achieved and what it means is not clear.

The Hague summit therefore is one of the most important Nato meetings in years. It was planned to address the hard truth that for too long European politicians have relied too much on the US defence umbrella.

Military experts have complained for years about Western Europe’s lack of preparation for conflict. I spoke a few days ago to one such expert, the British general Richard Shirreff, formerly Nato’s deputy supreme allied commander Europe.

In 2016, Gen Shirreff published a fictional predictive account of a future conflict entitled War with Russia: An Urgent Warning. Following the full Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s Nato members at The Hague are at last taking up Gen Shirreff’s main theme and committing to higher spending.

This summit therefore is hugely significant both for a sense of unity in public and for the very private conversations on how Western Europe will come to terms with Mr Trump and the new world order – or disorder, following the US attack on Iran's nuclear sites, and Iran's subsequent strike on the US air base at Al Udeid in Qatar.

Mr Trump showed at the G7 meeting in Canada that he likes photocalls and short meetings with world leaders but loathes long and detailed multilateral meetings. Increased spending commitments may be good enough for a public show of Nato solidarity. But those private conversations between Nato leaders could be problematic.

First, the US commitment to the destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme means the Trump administration’s focus is for the foreseeable future not on Europe at all.

Iran’s promise of retaliation, possibly against US bases, embassies and personnel, particularly in the Middle East, could further embroil Washington in what some fear could be another American “forever war”, like Iraq or Afghanistan.

Second, disruption to oil and gas supplies – including oil sales from Iran to China, and concerns about potential disruption to oil fields in neighbouring Arab nations – could rock the world economy and expose further tensions between the Trump administration and America’s allies.

The main Nato discussions in The Hague appear to have been cut short to accommodate the US President. The final communique is expected to be brief.

Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte is said to have a good relationship with Mr Trump, but Mr Rutte has also suggested Russia could attack a Nato member within five years, so any diminishing American interest in Europe potentially implies diminishing deterrence.

All these threats explain why Nato has expanded hugely since 1949. Nations formerly in the Soviet orbit – Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – are now Nato members. Traditionally neutral countries have also joined – Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024.

Nato’s 32 members therefore seem determined to cope with the challenges ahead, including perhaps the continuing loss of American interest.

The mood in The Hague recalls the old wisdom that if you want peace, prepare for war. Nato is in that preparatory phase right now. But one unanswered question keeps recurring. Has the US destroyed Iran’s enriched uranium, or – as some reports suggest – was it removed and hidden before the B2 bomber planes attacked?